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STRICT LIABILITY-PHARMACIST LIABILITY IN DISPENSING PRESCRIP-
TION DRUGS-DRUGS AND NARCOTICS-The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has determined that pharmacists cannot be held strictly lia-
ble as suppliers of defective products for injuries resulting from
prescription drugs.
Coyle v Richardson-Merrell, Inc., - Pa -, 584 A2d 1383 (1991).
William and Marie Coyle brought an action against Richardson-
Merrell, Inc.,1 the manufacturer of the drug Bendectin, 2 and Bon-
net Lane Pharmacy (hereinafter "Bonnet Lane"), the supplier of
the drug.3 The complaint alleged that their son was born with mal-
formed limbs as a result of his mother ingesting Bendectin during
pregnancy.4 The Coyles' complaint in the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas alleged that Bonnet Lane is a "seller of the prod-
uct, Bendectin, in the chain of distribution."' 5 The Common Pleas
Court granted Bonnet Lane's Motion for Summary Judgment and
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the granting of the
Motion." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur
7
on the issue of "whether a pharmacy should be subject to liability
as a supplier in accordance with the principle of strict liability
codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A." 8
1. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. is now Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., with the
name change effective in March, 1981. Brief for Appellees at 1, Coyle v Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., - Pa -, 584 A2d 1383 (1991).
2. Bendectin is a medication that is prescribed for the treatment of nausea and
vomiting in the early stages of pregnancy. Ramirez v Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F Supp
85, 86 (ED Pa 1985).
3. Coyle v Richardson-Merrell, Inc., - Pa -, 584 A2d 1383 (1991). This action
was brought on behalf of William Coyle, a minor, by his parents and natural guardians,
William and Marie Coyle, and by William and Marie Coyle in their own right. Coyle, 584
A2d at 1383.
4. Id at 1384.
5. Id.
6. Coyle v Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 15 Phila Cty Rptr 389 (Corn PI Phila Cty
(1987)), aft'd, 372 Pa Super 118, 538 A2d 1379 (1988).
7. Brief for Appellant at 1, Coyle, 584 A2d 1383 (1991). This appeal was taken by
allowance under 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 724(a) (1980) from the final order of the Superior
Court dated March 14, 1988. The Supreme Court granted the appeal in accordance with
PaRAP 1112. Brief for Appellant at 1, Coyle, 584 A2d 1383 (1991).
8. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1384. Section 402A reads:
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if a) the seller is engaged
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The superior court, in affirming the grant of summary judgment
in favor of the pharmacy, based its determination on a prior deci-
sion the court had rendered in Makripodis v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.9 In Makripodis, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that "a retail pharmacist [was] not required to
provide the patient-consumer such warnings as are required to be
provided to physicians by the manufacturers of prescription
drugs."' 1 The appellants in Coyle appealed the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the pharmacy and argued that Makripodis
was wrongly decided and should be overruled due to its unwar-
ranted departure from the law of supplier liability." Alternatively,
the Coyles alleged that the rationale of Makripodis did not pre-
clude the issue of strict liability.12
The supreme court first examined the Coyles' argument that
Makripodis should be overruled due to its unwarranted departure
from the law of supplier liability under section 402A, which had
been adopted in Webb v Zern3 as the law in Pennsylvania since
1966.14 The Coyles argued that under the rule of strict liability no
exception exists for pharmacists, whom the appellants character-
ized as "simply suppliers of prescription drugs.'
5
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania began its analysis by invali-
in the business of selling such product, and b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
2) the rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although a) the seller has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and b) the user or consumer
has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
9. 361 Pa Super 589, 523 A2d 374 (1987). In Makripodis, the plaintiff had alleged
that a pharmacy was strictly liable in tort as a retailer of a product that was unreasonably
dangerous due to the absence of warnings. Makripodis, 523 A2d at 377. See Incollingo v
Ewing, 444 Pa 263, 282 A2d 206 (1971), and Baldino v Castagna, 505 Pa 239, 478 A2d 807
(1984), in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in an action against drug manufactur-
ers based on inadequate warnings, considered the issue of whether proper and adequate
warnings were given to the prescribing physician. The court determined that it would be
incongruous to impose a greater duty on pharmacists than that imposed on drug manufac-
turers. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1384.
10. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1384, citing Makripodis, 523 A2d at 378.
11. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1384.
12. Id.
13. 422 Pa 424, 220 A2d 853 (1966).
14. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1384, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment f
(1965), which states that section 402A "applies to any manufacturer of such a product [and]
to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor.. . ." Coyle, 584 A2d at 1384. See also Fran-
cioni v Gibsonia Trucking Co., 472 Pa 362, 372 A2d 736 (1977), where the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania applied § 402A to cases involving suppliers other than sellers.
15. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1385.
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dating the basis upon which the Coyles rested their main argu-
ment. The court claimed that the Coyles' use of the Restatement
as the law of Pennsylvania was a "misperception" of the nature of
the law.1 Precepts, such as the Restatement, are just "common
law pronouncements by the courts. ' 17 The validity of the Restate-
ments precepts depends solely upon the reasoning supporting
them."8 Such precepts are not controlling in the manner of a stat-
ute because, unlike a statute, the court has the power and obliga-
tion to refuse to apply the rule when its application would violate
its basis of reasoning. 9 Courts retain the right and duty to test the
rule against contrary arguments presented in a given case.20 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that it was incorrect to as-
sume that section 402A, as stated or developed by case law, con-
tained no exceptions.21 A relevant exception to section 402A is
found in comment k, which explicitly provides for some products
that are "incapable of being made safe for their ordinary and in-
tended use.
'22
The exception was relevant to the present case in that the seller
of such products, provided they are properly prepared and mar-
keted with the proper directions and warnings, will not be held
strictly liable.23 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania justified the
refusal to expand the rule of strict liability to include pharmacists
by explaining that the court has refused to extend the rule to in-







22. Id. Section 402A comment k provides in part:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their ordinary and intended use. These are espe-
cially common in the field of drugs... . Such a product, properly prepared, and ac-
companied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of
which, for this very reason cannot be legally sold except to physicians, or under the
prescription of a physician.. . . The seller of such products, again with the qualifica-
tion that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given,
where the situation calls for it, is not to be held strictly liable for unfortunate conse-
quences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public
with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but appar-
ently reasonable risk.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965).
23. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1385.
1991
Duquesne Law Review
be advanced.24 Since Incollingo v Ewing25 was decided in 1971, the
Pennsylvania courts have made it clear that, when a drug "is avail-
able only upon prescription of a duly licensed physician, the warn-
ing required is not to the general public or to the patient but to
the prescribing doctor. '26 In formulating the above-mentioned
rule, the supreme court relied on comment k of the Restatement
and its underlying policies.27
The prescription drug exemption was further extended by the
superior court in Makripodis.28 The court in Makripodis held that
the prescribing physician has a duty to be "fully aware of (1) the
characteristics of the drug that he is prescribing, (2) the amount of
the drug which can be safely administered, and (3) the different
medications the patient is taking."29 The physician then has the
duty to advise the patient as to the dangers and side effects associ-
ated with any drug that he prescribes.3 The warnings accompany-
ing drugs are to be directed by the manufacturer to the physician
(rather than to the patient-consumer), informing the physician of
the potential dangers associated with the medications to be pre-
scribed.3 1 The physician can use his "independent medical judge-
ment, taking into account the data supplied to him by the manu-
facturer, other medical literature, and any other source available to
him, and weigh[] that knowledge against the personal medical his-
tory of his patient" in deciding whether to prescribe a particular
drug."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania asserted that the Coyles
overlooked the rule and reasbning in Incollingo, as demonstrated
by their argument that pharmacists have an independent duty to
warn of the dangers of the prescriptions they dispense.3 3 The rule
in Incollingo provides that warnings are to be directed to the phy-
sician, who is most capable of evaluating them and explaining
24. Id. See also Musser v Vilsmeier Auction Co., 522 Pa 367, 562 A2d 279, 284 (1989),
where the court held that an auctioneer was not a "seller" for strict liability purposes; and
Nath v National Equip. Leasing Corp., 497 Pa 126, 439 A2d 633, 636 (1981), in which strict
liability was held not to apply to a "lessor" under a secured transaction financing device.
25. 444 Pa 263, 282 A2d 206 (1971).
26. Incollingo, 282 A2d at 220.
27. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1385, citing Incollingo, 282 A2d 206 (1971).
28. Makripodis, 523 A2d 374 (1987).
29. Id at 378.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id, quoting Leibowitz v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa Super 418, 307 A2d
449, 457 (1973).
33. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1386.
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them to individual patients.3 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted an inconsistency in holding pharmacists to a duty to warn
patients of the risks of drugs when manufacturers had no duty to
directly warn them.35
A pharmacist's ability to distribute prescription drugs is more
restricted than the marketing system for most other products.36
Pharmacists, as suppliers, have no choice in what drug to make
available to the consumer, nor can the patient, as consumer, freely
choose which drug to buy. 7 With regard to the communication of
warnings, the supreme court in Coyle was convinced that a differ-
ent rule must be applied in this chain of distribution due to the
fact that physicians act as intermediaries, nullifying the discretion
of both the pharmacist-supplier and the patient-consumer.3 8 Un-
less a distinction is made for pharmacists concerning liability for
the communication of warnings, the patient-consumer would be re-
ceiving information about risks of medications from someone unfa-
miliar with the patient's medical condition. 9
Other considerations fortify the above rule, such as the fact that
the risks have already been weighed by the patient's physician who
has the necessary knowledge of his patient's medical needs.40 Fur-
thermore, the patient-consumer would be unable to properly assess
the information.4 ' Once a drug has been prescribed, the pharmacist
has no need to supply information because the doctor has the duty
to warn the patient about the drug.42 The pharmacist's interfer-
ence would undermine the physician-patient relationship by pre-
cipitating "fear, doubt and second-guessing. '43
The Coyles argued that Makripodis was not applicable and that
the pharmacist may be subject to strict liability as a supplier of a
defective product even if he has no duty to warn.44 Because no
other defect had been alleged by the Coyles, other than that the











44. Id. The Coyles argued that, in the alternative, the pharmacy may be subject to
strict liability even if there was no duty to warn. Id.
1991
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formed limbs, the court found the Coyles' alternative argument to
be unclear.4 5 The court considered the issue of whether the drug
used by Mrs. Coyle was of the type intended to be covered by com-
ment k of section 402A, which describes "an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasona-
ble risk.
'48
The Coyles argued that comment k was inapplicable to their
claim because of the fact that the defendants denied that the drug
was inherently unsafe. 41 The court maintained that the Coyles' ar-
gument was unfounded because the Coyles themselves had drafted
their claim as a products liability case under section 402A.4s In
their complaint, the Coyles alleged that Bendectin was "unavoid-
ably dangerous" and "inherently unsafe. '49 The defendants as-
serted that Bendectin does not cause birth defects.5 0 The fact re-
mained that Bendectin is a prescription drug, the distribution of
which is limited due to the necessity of a physician's analysis of
the benefits and risks associated with the patient taking the drug.51
The court held that comment k demonstrated that the rule of sec-
tion 402A is one of strict liability requiring policy considerations.2
The rationale of section 402A is set out in comment c to that
section.53
The supreme court determined in Francioni v Gibsonia Truck
Corp.4 that the rationale supporting section 402A as applied to
45. Id. The Coyles did not allege that the drug was useless for its prescribed purpose
or that it caused the adverse consequence of malformed limbs. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id at 1386-87.




53. Id, citing Restatement of Torts (Second) § 402A comment c (1965), which
provides:
The seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who
may be injured by it; ... the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of
products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputa-
ble sellers will stand behind their goods;... public policy demands that the burden
of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed on
those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability
insurance can be obtained; and... the consumer of such products is entitled to the
maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it
are those who market the products.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment c (1965).
54. 472 Pa 362, 372 A2d 736 (1977).
Vol. 30:181
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sellers was also to be applied to lessors. 55 In Francioni, the court
isolated four factors in support of its rationale: (1) supplier liabil-
ity makes a member of the marketing chain available to the in-
jured plaintiff for redress; (2) strict liability provides an incentive
to safety; (3) a supplier is in a better position to prevent the circu-
lation of defective products; and (4) the supplier can distribute the
cost of compensation for injuries resulting from defects by charg-
ing for it in its business.56
The above factors weigh against application of the rule of section
402A when addressing a pharmacist's role as supplier in prescrip-
tion drug transactions.57 In the restricted distribution system of
prescription drugs, the public is not forced to rely on a pharmacist
to obtain the products they need. A patient relies on his physician
to assess the risks inherent in a prescription drug.58 No safety in-
centive would be provided by holding pharmacists strictly liable
because a pharmacist is not at liberty to substitute his judgment
for that of the physician when presented with a prescription. 9 It
would ill-serve the needs of the public to impose a duty on phar-
macists in an attempt to prevent the circulation of defective prod-
ucts because pharmacists might refuse to fill necessary prescrip-
tions in an attempt to avoid potential liability.60 In support of
their argument, the Coyles asserted only that pharmacists were
able to obtain insurance and/or indemnification as the means of
distributing the cost of potential liability.61 However, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court stated that reliance on this cost-shifting fac-
tor alone to determine whether or not to expose a party to liability
would result in absolute rather than strict liability.6 2 Accordingly,
the court declined to extend the rule of strict supplier liability to
pharmacists and affirmed the judgment of the superior court.63
Justice Papadakos concurred in the result of the case, stating
55. Francioni, 372 A2d at 739-40.
56. Id at 739.






63. Id, citing Raynor v Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 643 F Supp 238 (D DC 1986); Rami-
rez v Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 628 F Supp 85 (ED Pa 1985); Murphy v E.R. Squibb &
Sons, 221 Cal Rptr 447, 710 P2d 247 (1985); Ullman v Grant, 114 Misc 2d 220, 450 NYS2d
955 (1982); Batiste v American Home Prods. Corp., 32 NC App 1, 231 SE2d 269 (1977);
Bichler v Willing, 397 NYS2d 57, 58 A2d 331 (1977); McLeod v W.S. Merrell Co., 174 S2d
736 (Fla 1965).
1991
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only that it was his belief that "the proper application of Comment
K, Section 402A, to the facts of this case [was] dispositive of the
issue of strict liability of the pharmacists.
'6 4
The Pennsylvania courts have adopted section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts to apply strict liability to manufactur-
ers, retailers, and dealers of products.6 5 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court adopted section 402A as the law of Pennsylvania in 1966.66
Prior to 1965, recovery against product sellers was sought under
both negligence and implied warranty theories.17 Strict liability, as
described in section 402A, imposes strict liability for physical harm
on the seller of any product in a defective condition which is un-
reasonably dangerous to the consumer.6 8 Liability is imposed de-
spite the fact that the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of the product.6 Under section 402A, the
product must be "defective" and unreasonably dangerous for lia-
bility to attach. In other words, something must be wrong with the
product.70 A product can have a design defect in which the end
result of the manufacturing process was not the intended result
and the resulting product is more dangerous than the intended
64. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1388.
65. Burch v Sears, Roebuck and Co., 320 Pa Super 444, 467 A2d 615 (1983). "Under
our products liability law, all suppliers of a defective product in the chain of distribution,
whether retailers, partmakers, assemblers, owners, sellers, lessors, or any other relevant cat-
egory, are potentially liable to the ultimate user injured by the defect." Burch, 467 A2d at
621. The Supreme Court in Francioni held that "all suppliers of products engaged in the
business of supplying products for use or consumption by the public are subject to strict
liability.. . ." Francioni, 372 A2d at 739.
66. Webb, 220 A2d at 853. In Webb, the supreme court adopted a new basis of liabil-
ity. Suit was brought against a beer distributor, the brewer which filled the kegs of beer, and
the manufacturer of the keg, for severe injuries sustained by the plaintiff when the keg of
beer exploded upon his entering the room. The plaintiff relied on an "exclusive control"
theory because he had no idea who was responsible for the explosion. The trial court dis-
missed the complaint, denying the applicability of the doctrine due to plaintiff's failure to
join his father who had purchased the keg, and his brother who had tapped the keg. The
trial court thought these activities possibly caused the explosion. Because the statute of
limitations had run and no additional defendants were permitted to be joined, the lower
court entered judgment. The plaintiff appealed and the superior court adopted "a new basis
of liability" and vacated the judgment of the Common Pleas Court and remanded with in-
structions to enter an order permitting the plaintiff to amend the complaint to state a cause
of action in trespass for defective products liability. Id at 854-55.
67. Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability:
What Liability Rule Should be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products? 78 Ky
L J 705, 709-10 (1989-90).
68. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. See note 8 for the text of § 402A.
69. Id.
70. See Ausness, 78 Ky L J at 711 (cited in note 67).
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product would have been.7 ' Courts approach this type of defect
with the "deviation from the norm" test, which looks to see if the
product deviates from the manufacturer's intended design or is in-
ferior to products of the same description.72 A design defect can
make a properly-manufactured product unreasonably dangerous. 73
A product with a design defect is defective if it is more dangerous
than an ordinary consumer would expect it to be. This is referred
to by courts as the "consumer expectation test" because it looks to
the expectations of the ordinary consumer. 4 The "consumer ex-
pectation test" does not require a perfectly safe product that is
risk free, but attempts to protect buyers against unexpected prod-
uct risks.7 5 Attaching a warning to a product is one way to dimin-
ish its dangers.76 "Failure to warn" is a part of product design de-
fect cases, although viewed by some courts as a third way of
making a product defective and unreasonably dangerous. 77 In de-
sign defect cases, a third approach is used which balances the risks
and benefits of a specific product as designed against the risks and
benefits of an alternative and less risky design proposed by the
plaintiff.78 The product is considered defective if the overall utility
of the alternative design exceeds that of the existing design of the
product.
7 9
Two years after Webb, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
a bottle manufacturer and the distributor of the bottle strictly lia-
ble under section 402A by imposing liability throughout the chain
of distribution. The plaintiff in Bialek v Pittsburgh Brewing Co.80
suffered personal injuries when a bottle of beer that had been
stored in the rear of his tavern exploded in his hand.8 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case because
the lower court refused to permit the plaintiff's expert witness to
testify.82 The court stated, " . . . if Dr. Anderson is believed, the
71. Comment, Drug Products Liability: Duty to Warn, 49 U Pitt L Rev 283, 285
(1987).
72. Ausness, 78 Ky L J at 711 n.35 (cited in note 67).
73. Comment, 49 U Pitt L Rev at 285 (cited in note 71).
74. Ausness, 78 Ky L J at 712 (cited in note 67).
75. Id.
76. Comment, 49 U Pitt L Rev at 285-86 (cited in note 71).
77. Id at 286 nn.16-17.
78. Ausness, 78 Ky L J at 712 (cited in note 67).
79. Id.
80. 430 Pa 176, 242 A2d 231 (1968).
81. Bialek, 242 A2d at 232.
82. Id at 235. The exclusion of Dr. Anderson's opinion that internal pressure on the
defective bottle caused an explosion was considered severely prejudicial to the plaintiff. Id.
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bottle was defectively manufactured by Glenshaw Glass Company
and consequently Glenshaw Glass as well as all successive sellers of
the defective product are liable. This is not because they caused
the defect, but because they sold the defective product.""3
In almost every controversy in which a plaintiff has alleged a
product to be defective, the Pennsylvania appellate courts have,
applying section 402A, attached liability to every entity in the
product's chain of distribution."4 Section 402A has been used to
hold manufacturers, distributors, and sellers of products strictly li-
able."5 In addition, strict liability under 402A has been expanded
to include cases that involve a wide spectrum of products.8 8
Strict liability attached to the manufacturer, distributor, and
seller of a lawn mower which was found to have a defective design
in Burch v Sears, Roebuck and Co. 87 In Burch, the plaintiff was
cutting grass with an electric lawn mower.8 8 The mower shut off
twice and would not restart until the reset button was pushed.8 9
The third time it happened, the plaintiff, in an attempt to unclog
the rotor blade, placed the mower on its side and removed clumps
of grass with his left hand.90 He did not touch the restart button,
but the motor started and severely injured his right hand.91 The
courts, in determining liability to consumers, had previously noted
that the lack of a deadman's switch92 on a lawnmower is an obvi-
ous design defect, and that the act of placing one's name on a
product is a factor in assessing responsibility because it frequently
causes a product to be used in reliance upon the seller's reputa-
tion.9 3 For example, people buy products made by various manu-
facturers from Sears and Roebuck in reliance upon Sears' reputa-
tion. The lower court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff
83. Id at 236.
84. See Bialek, 242 A2d 231 (1968) (bottle exploded); Burch, 467 A2d 615 (1983)
(lawn mower); Agostino v Rockwell Mfg. Co., 236 Pa Super 434, 345 A2d 735 (1975) (power
saw); Hoffman v Loos and Dilworth, Inc., 307 Pa Super 131, 452 A2d 1349 (1982) (fire from
linseed oil); Francioni, 372 A2d 736 (1977) (tractor); Schriner v Pennsylvania Power and
Light Co., 348 Pa Super 177, 501 A2d 1128 (1985) (electric utility).
85. Bialek, 242 A2d at 236. See also cases listed in note 84.
86. Bialek, 242 A2d at 236.
87. 320 Pa Super 444, 467 A2d 615 (1983).




92. Id. A "deadman's switch" automatically turns off the power when the operator of
the tool releases the controls. Id.
93. Id at 624.
Vol. 30:181
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and required an equal contribution from Sears, the seller of the
product, and General Electric, the supplier of the mower's electri-
cal system including the reset button, motor, and on/off switch.
9 4
In Agostino v Rockwell Mfg. Co.,95 an action was brought against
the manufacturer and the seller of a power saw for an injury to the
leg of the purchaser due to a malfunctioning telescopic blade
guard.96 The saw that was purchased was constructed so that after
completion of a cut, a telescopic guard would automatically be re-
leased from the housing, covering the blade and thereby prevent-
ing the user from being cut.97 When the appellant attempted to
put the saw on a bench after severing a board, the blade grabbed
his trousers and cut deeply into his thigh." The superior court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence of a defect making the
saw unreasonably dangerous to the user and remanded for a new
trial, determining that a nonsuit had been improperly entered.19
The chain was further extended in Hoffman v Loos and
Dilworth, Inc.,100 in which wrongful death and survival claims in a
trespass action were instituted as a result of plaintiffs' child suffer-
ing severe burns and death.101 A spontaneous combustion occurred
from rags which had been used by the father of the child to apply
linseed oil to the kitchen floor of their home.10 2 A defect was al-
leged due to an inadequate warning regarding the possibility of
spontaneous combustion.10 3 The chain of distribution was held to
include not only the packager, Loos and Dilworth, but also the
manufacturer, Honeymead Products Company, the distributor and
transporter, C.J. Osborn Company, and the sales agent, E.W.
Kaufmann Company.10 4 The E.W. Kaufmann Company filed a Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment which was granted but subsequently
94. Id. The superior court affirmed the indemnification of Sears (the retailer) by
General Electric (the supplier). Id. The court stated that, to achieve the policy of compen-
sating the injured party, Pennsylvania permits remedies of indemnity and contribution "so
that among those in the chain of distribution, liability may ultimately rest with, or be
shared equally among, those who can best detect, control, or prevent the defect." 42 Pa
Cons Stat Ann §§ 8321-27. Burch, 467 A2d at 621-22.
95. 236 Pa Super 434, 345 A2d 735 (1975).
96. Agostino, 345 A2d at 737.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id at 741.
100. 307 Pa Super 131, 452 A2d 1349 (1982).
101. Hoffman, 452 A2d at 1350-51.
102. Id at 1350.




reversed by the superior court based on the 402A principle of the
chain of distribution.'05 Because E.W. Kaufmann Company sup-
plied the chattel, it was held to be in the distribution chain as a
"supplier" of the product.10 6
In view of the fact that section 402A refers to "one who sells any
product," the application of strict liability in tort to lessors had
never been considered by the courts. 1 07 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held in Francioni v Gibsonia Trucking Co. 08 that the doc-
trine of strict liability extends to suppliers of products engaged in
the business of supplying products for use or consumption by the
public, including lessors engaged in such a business.10 9 In Fran-
cioni, Justice Nix extended supplier liability to the lessor of a trac-
tor which had a defective steering component."0 The supreme
court rejected a narrow construction of the word "seller" and ap-
plied liability to the supplier."' The expansion of strict liability
beyond "sellers" to include any supplier engaged in the business of
supplying products for use or consumption by the public was evi-
denced in Francioni."
2
A lessor was again held liable under a strict liability theory as a
"supplier" of a product containing an alleged design defect in Fo-
ley v Clark Equip. Co."' In Foley, the plaintiff was struck by a
forklift and filed an action against the manufacturer, distributor,
and lessor to recover for his injuries. The complaint alleged that
the defendants were strictly liable under'the Restatement (Second)
of Torts for selling or leasing the forklift in an unreasonably dan-
gerous condition." 4 The forklift was alleged to be in an unreasona-
bly dangerous condition because: (1) it lacked warning devices
which would have alerted a passerby to the presence of the truck,
(2) the driver's visibility was obstructed by the truck's frontal car-
riage, and (3) there was a failure in the forward mode to warn of
dangers attending operation of the truck." 5 The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Foley and against both Clark, the designer and
105. Id at 1355.
106. Id.
107. Francioni, 372 A2d at 737.
108. Id.
109. Id at 739.
110. Id at 741.
111. Id at 739.
112. Id.
113. 361 Pa Super 599, 523 A2d 379 (1987).




manufacturer, and Industrial Lift Truck Company, a distributor of
Clark products.116
Subsequently, strict liability was applied against an electric pub-
lic utility by the superior court in Schriner v Pennsylvania Power
and Light Co. 117 In Schriner, farmers brought an action for dam-
ages for loss of dairy cattle against the electric power company
which electrified the farmers' milking equipment.11 The court held
that electricity is a "product" and that if electricity "in a defective
condition, unreasonably dangerous" passed through the meter of a
user or consumer and into the stream of commerce, causing physi-
cal harm to the ultimate user or his property, the doctrine of strict
liability in tort may be applied against the public utility.119
Sellers of defective pharmaceutical products are theoretically
subject to strict liability in the same way as sellers of other prod-
ucts.120 In the case of pharmaceutical products, courts have been
reluctant to apply strict liability to manufacturers and distributors
of prescription drugs due to a qualifying rule for "unavoidably un-
safe" products. The rule is found in comment k to section 402A,
which reads in relevant part: "Unavoidably unsafe products: there
are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordi-
nary use."1 21 Comment k gives examples rather than a definition of
products that are "unavoidably unsafe. ' 122 These examples include
116. Id at 382.
117. 348 Pa Super 177, 501 A2d 1128 (1985).
118. Schriner, 501 A2d at 1129. The dairy cattle, as a result of a mastitis infection,
either died or had to be destroyed. The Schriners alleged that the infection was the result of
"stray voltage" from milking equipment which had been manufactured by the dairy com-
pany and electrified by the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company. Id.
119. Id at 1134.
120. Ausness, 78 Ky L J at 707 (cited in note 67).
121. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. See also Ausness, 78 Ky L J at 707 (cited
in note 67), and Comment, 49 U Pitt L Rev at 287 (cited in note 71) for a discussion of
comment k to § 402A.
122. § 402A comment k states in part:
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not
uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected.
Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and
the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidably high degree
of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The
same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this rea-
son cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physi-
cian. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which,
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can
be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experi-
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the Pasteur vaccine, "drugs, vaccines, and the like," and new or
experimental drugs.12 3 The examples listed in comment k comprise
only pharmaceutical products. 24 It appears that the drafters in-
tended to limit the scope of comment k to drugs, vaccines, and
similar products. 25 Most of the existing "comment k cases involve
either chemical drugs, antibiotics, vaccines, blood, or medical
devices.' 26
To prevent "unavoidably unsafe" products from being defective
and unreasonably dangerous, a seller is required to warn of dangers
"if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonably devel-
oped human skill and foresight should have knowledge" of the
danger. 2 Once a seller complies with the duty to warn of potential
dangers, he is no longer responsible for the consequences. 28 How-
ever, breach of the duty to warn may lead to the imposition of
strict liability.129 Comment k specifies that
the seller of such products [unavoidably unsafe], again with the qualifica-
tion that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is
given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has under-
taken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product,
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.130
Therefore, the seller of such products can avoid liability by provid-
ing a warning.
In Incollingo v Ewing,'' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ap-
plied comment k as the basis of their refusal to apply strict liabil-
ity to the "sellers" of the drug Chloromycetin.1 2 Chloromycetin
was an antibiotic which allegedly caused injuries and death to the
minor who had been provided with the prescription.' The court
ence as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medi-
cally recognizable risk.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k. See note 22 for the partial text of com-
ment k.
123. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k.
124. Ausness, 78 Ky L J at 714 n.48 (cited in note 67).
125. Id.
126. Id at 714-15 nn.49-53.
127. Comment, 49 U Pitt L Rev at 286 (cited in note 71).
128. Id at 287.
129. Id.
130. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k. See notes 22 and 122 for the
partial text of comment k.
131. Incollingo, 282 A2d at 206.
132. Id at 220. Chloromycetin is a trade name for Chloramphenicol, a broad spectrum




in Incollingo held that the manufacturer was liable only if it failed
to exercise reasonable care in informing those, for whose use the
drug was supplied, of the facts which made it likely to be
dangerous."'
In Baldino v Castagna,1 3 5 a patient who allegedly suffered side
effects as a result of taking a drug brought an action against the
manufacturer of the drug to recover for alleged negligence in mar-
keting."'6 The Supreme Court found the manufacturer not liable in
light of its previous decision in Incollingo, in which the court "rec-
ognized a cause of action against drug manufacturers for the over-
promotion of a drug that nullify otherwise adequate warnings.
1 3
Although there was contradictory testimony 3 8 in Baldino, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania held that the evidence, including
published warnings as to the use of the drug, was sufficient to sup-
port the jury finding that the manufacturer was not negligent and
not liable.139
Pennsylvania courts have held that the duty of the manufacturer
to warn must be directed to the physician who is able to properly
assess the warning and not the patient-consumer in the distribu-
tion of prescription drugs.1 40 The Incollingo decision in 1971 held
that, in order for the information about the risks and benefits of
such medications to be effective, it had to be directed to the pre-
scribing physician: "Since the drug was available only upon pre-
scription of a duly licensed physician, the warning required is not
134. Id at 220. The court stated that a drug manufacturer can be held to have
breached his duty of reasonable care by promoting its product in such a way as to nullify
printed warnings. Resolution of "whether or not the printed words of warning were...
cancelled out and rendered meaningless in light of sales effort ... were questions properly
for the jury." Id.
135. 505 Pa 239, 478 A2d 807 (1984).
136. Baldino, 478 A2d at 810. The plaintiff sought to show that the manufacturer,
CIBA-GEIGY, promoted the drug in such a manner as to cause the doctor to over-prescribe
the drug and that this promotional campaign had the effect of nullifying otherwise adequate
warnings. Id.
137. Id, citing Incollingo, 282 A2d at 220.
138. The contradictory testimony involved the rebuttal of Dr. Castagna's admission
that he relied on the detail men rather than the published warnings. The doctor claimed
that they told him to ignore the published warnings and that the warnings did not apply to
short-term therapy. Two detail men who serviced the doctor at the time directly rebutted
his testimony. The jury made a determination as to credibility and found adversely to Dr.
Castagna. Baldino, 478 A2d at 812.
139. Id. The issue over the contradictory testimony was whether the detail men's com-
ments negated the manufacturer's warnings. Id.
140. Incollingo, 282 A2d at 263. See also Leibowitz v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224
Pa Super 418, 307 A2d 449, 457 (1973).
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to the general public or to the patient, but to the prescribing doc-
tor." '141 In Baldino, the issue to be determined was whether the
warning, if any, that was given to the prescribing physicians was
proper and adequate. 142 The Baldino court held that the warnings
applicable to the drug were adequate because they complied with
Food and Drug Administration standards, 43 they were published
in the Physician's Desk Reference,4 and individual warnings were
in the container.
145
In Leibowitz v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 46 decided in 1973,
the superior court stated that, "because said insert [warning pa-
tients with recent thrombophlebitis] was directed to the practicing
physician, who should have been aware of the literature pro and
con, we cannot as a matter of law conclude that the insert was
misleading or inadequate.' 147 The package insert provided by the
manufacturer was held to adequately represent available medical
and pharmacological data resulting from an independent investiga-
tion pursued by the manufacturer of Ortho-Novum.14s The court in
Makripodis expounded upon the reasoning for requiring that all
warnings about potential dangers associated with prescription
141. Incollingo, 282 A2d at 220, citing Stottlemire v Cawood, 213 F Supp 897, 899 (D
DC 1963) (a case involving the drug Chloromycetin).
142. Baldino, 478 A2d at 810.
143. Id. Printed warnings must comply with required standards set by the Food and
Drug Administration. See also Comment, 49 U Pitt L Rev at 301 (cited in note 71). The
FDA imposes professional labeling requirements on all drug products distributed by the
drug manufacturer to pharmacists and other retailers. Id. The label must be conspicuous
and the directions and warnings must be prominent. Id. The label must also include dosage
information, directions for use, conditions for which the drug is effective, contraindications,
and warnings about side effects and adverse reactions. Id.
144. Baldino, 478 A2d at 810. The Physicians' Desk Reference is a standard reference
work, published annually, containing the current warnings of drugs authorized for distribu-
tion by the FDA. Id.
145. Id. It was established that each container had an individual printed recital of the
then current warnings. Id.
146. 224 Pa Super 418, 307 A2d 449 (1973). This appeal involved two lawsuits which
were consolidated for trial involving negligence and breach of express and implied warran-
ties. Doris Leibowitz attempted to recover damages for a thrombophlebitic condition that
allegedly was suffered as a result of ingestion of "Ortho-Novum," a contraceptive pin devel-
oped by Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation. Leibowitz, 307 A2d at 457.
147. Id.
148. Id at 459. The evidence indicated that Ortho had pursued vigorous independent
investigation and that Ortho had assisted Dr. Irving Wright and a special ad hoc committee
that he headed which had been summoned by the FDA. Id. See also id at 452. In addition,
studies conducted by independent laboratories and research groups before and during Mrs.
Leibowitz's condition failed to establish any causal connection between the use of Ortho-
Novum and thrombophlebitis. Id at 459.
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drugs be provided to the prescribing physicians. 49 The Pennsylva-
nia Superior Court stated that "the prescribing physicians are, in
the case of prescription drugs, the actual consumers." 5 0 In addi-
tion, the warnings are directed to the physician rather than the
patient-consumer since it is his duty to be "fully aware of the char-
acteristics of the drug he is prescribing, the amount of the drug
which can be safely administered, and the different medications
the patient is taking.' 5' The duty of the manufacturer to warn the
physician rather than the patient is based upon the theory that the
physician acts as an "informed intermediary" between the manu-
facturer and the patient by evaluating the patient's needs, assess-
ing the risks and benefits of the drugs available, advising the pa-
tient of possible side effects, and supervising the use of the drug.1
5 2
The majority of recent cases in Pennsylvania and other jurisdic-
tions 53 have held that pharmacists have no duty to warn consum-
ers of possible adverse reactions inherent in the use of prescription
drugs. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in both Makripodis
and Coyle, determined that pharmacists would not be held strictly
liable for not providing patients a warning on the basis of policy
considerations in the context of comment k and the "learned inter-
mediary" rule.15 4 The physician's role in evaluating the specific
health needs of individual patients is critical to public health, and
imposing a duty to warn on pharmacists could have an adverse im-
149. Makripodis, 523 A2d at 374. In this products liability action against a drug man-
ufacturer and owner of a pharmacy, the parents of a child born with congenital abnormali-
ties alleged that the defects resulted from the mother's ingestion of the drug Bendectin. Id
at 375.
150. Id at 378.
151. Id.
152. Id. See also Leibowitz, 307 A2d at 465, citing Paul D. Rheingold, Products Liabil-
ity-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability 18 Rutgers L Rev 947, 985-86 (1964),
which states:
As a general proposition in products liability law there is a duty to warn the in-
tended or foreseeable consumer of a product about its dangerous aspects. This duty
exists even when there is an intermediary in the chain of distribution who takes some
control over the product.. . . An important and sound exception to the requirement
that warning be made to the consumer, however, is made in products cases in which
the intermediary is not a mere conduit of the product but rather administers it on an
individual basis, or recommends it in some way, implying an independent duty to
evaluate the risks and transmit relevant warnings to the user. The ethical drug cases,
involving as they always do the epitome of such intermediary, who exercises indepen-
dent discretion and judgement would seem to fit more closely within the exception
than the rule.
Id.
153. See Comment, 49 U Pitt L Rev at 288 n.30 (cited in note 71).
154. Makripodis, 523 A2d at 597; Coyle, 584 A2d at 1384.
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pact on the physician-patient relationship.155
The United States District Court of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held in Ramirez v Richardson-Merrell, Inc.156 that
"the weighing of benefits of medication against potential dangers
that are associated with it, which is the basis of the prescription
system, requires an individualized medical judgement which only
the physician can provide. ' 157 The importance of the physician's
role in evaluating the specific health needs of each patient on an
individual basis was further supported by the Superior Court in
Makripodis.15 The court in Makripodis stressed that the imposi-
tion of a duty to warn upon a pharmacist "would be unwise and
would ill-serve the interests of the consuming public because the
patient-consumer cannot properly assess and weigh the benefits
and risks associated with using the drug."' 59 The pharmacist, who
may not be familiar with the medical history and condition of the
patient and is not trained to diagnose and treat disease, would be
intruding on the doctor-patient relationship if he was required to
provide the consumer with the warnings provided by the drug
manufacturer. 60 The courts nationwide have adopted the policy of
not interjecting the pharmacist into the patient-physician relation-
ship.' 6 1 Imposing a duty on pharmacists to warn would compel
155. Comment, 49 U Pitt L Rev at 295 (cited in note 71).
156. 628 F Supp 85 (ED Pa 1986). This case was a products liability action which
included two counts against the pharmacy that had filled a prescription that allegedly
caused birth defects to a child of a mother who had ingested Bendectin. Ramirez, 628 F
Supp at 86. The district court held that the pharmacy that filled the prescription had not
breached any duty owed to the patient-consumer because it had used due and proper care in
filling the prescription and in the compounding process. Id at 88. The pharmacist also satis-
fied its required duty of ensuring that the drug was not altered by any foreign substance. No
duty to warn of potential hazards associated with the drug was required of the pharmacist.
Id.
157. Id.
158. Makripodis, 523 A2d at 378. The court in Makripodis stated that "each individ-
ual for whom [prescription drugs] are prescribed is a unique organism who must be ex-
amined by a physician who is aware of the nature of the patient's condition as well as the
medical history of the patient." Id at 377.
159. Id at 378.
160. Id.
161. See Eldridge v Eli Lilly & Co., 38 IlM App 3d 124, 485 NE2d 551, 553 (1985);
Raynor v Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 643 F Supp 238, 245-47 (D DC 1986) (a pharmacist may
not "substitute its judgment" for the prescribing doctor); Jones v Irvin, 602 F Supp 399, 402
(SD Ill 1985) ("placing these duties to warn on the pharmacist would only serve to compel
the pharmacist to second guess every prescription a doctor orders"); Ealy v Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., CA No 83-3504, slip op at 6 (D DC Jan 12, 1987) (DRR 18b) (imposition of a
duty to warn "would, in effect, require a pharmacy to substitute its judgment for that of the
prescribing physician"); Johnson v Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No B-83-3814, slip op at 5 (D
Md June 1, 1984) (DRR 28b) (402A comment k provides an exception for retail druggists:
198
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them to second guess every prescription a physician writes in order
to escape liability.16 2 Another factor to be considered in shifting
strict liability to pharmacists would be the need for the pharmacist
to acquire third party or self-insurance coverage. 163 This would be
passed along to the consumer in the form of higher product
costs. 6 4 Ramirez stated that "to hold a druggist strictly liable
would be to make the druggist an insurer of the safety of the man-
ufactured drug and would impose on the retail druggist the obliga-
tion to test, at its own expense, new drugs.' 1 65 High costs of phar-
maceutical products could impact the poor the most severely and
especially those without adequate health coverage for prescription
drugs. "6 Also, because customers are charged uniformly for the
drugs, the low income customers would essentially be subsidizing
the wealthier customers. 67 Under strict liability, although the
damages for lost earnings and future pain and suffering are immea-
surably different between an unskilled person and a professional,
they would both pay the same for expanded protection.'6 " In addi-
tion, pharmacists may refuse to sell generic brands because of their
greater risks as compared to selling well-known brand names.1
6 9
Pharmacists may confine their sales to lower-risk drugs and refuse
to sell higher-risk products with potentially serious side effects,
thereby curtailing availability.
17 0
The Supreme Court of California, in Murphy v E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc.,"" exempted pharmacists from strict liability based on a
totally different theory and relied on the concept that the pharma-
"There is simply no recognized duty of pharmacists to second-guess the medicines pre-
scribed by doctors").
162. Makripodis, 523 A2d at 378.
163. Frank J. Vandall, Applying Strict Liability to Pharmacists, 18 U Toledo L Rev
1, 22 (1986).
164. Leonard J. Nelson & Stanley Susina, The Case against Applying Strict Liability
to Pharmacists: A Reply to Professor Vandall, 19 U Toledo L Rev 783, 792 (1988).
165. Ramirez, 628 F Supp at 87, citing Bichler v Willing, 397 NYS2d 57, 58 A2d 331
(1977), which, relying on comment k, rejected the argument that retail pharmacists should
be under an obligation to independently test the drug's chemical structure for side effects or
other possible risks and held that retail pharmacists are not to be held strictly liable for a
failure to warn of the potential hazards associated with the ingestion of a prescribed drug.
166. Nelson & Susina, 19 U Toledo L Rev at 792 (cited in note 164).
167. Id.
168. Id at-792-93. The authors explain this by showing that the loss of future earnings
and future pain and suffering of a lawyer are much greater than those of an unskilled la-
borer. Id at 793.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 221 Cal Rptr 447, 710 P2d 247 (1985).
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cist is furnishing a service rather than selling a product. 7 2 Murphy
determined that patients who go to a pharmacy to have a prescrip-
tion filled are really interested in the sale of the product and not
the advice of the pharmacist. 73 Because the California court con-
sidered a state statute17 4 that defines the practice of pharmacy as
"not only a profession .. .but also a 'dynamic patient-oriented
health service,. . .'" a pharmacist's conduct was deemed to be a




The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted section 402A of the
Restatement as the law in Pennsylvania in 1965,176 and has since
applied it uniformly and without exception to all sellers of prod-
ucts in the chain of distribution. 17 7 Although the pharmacist is a
supplier like the supplier of any other product, and should be lia-
ble in the chain of distribution for injuries caused by the use of its
product, the superior court has demonstrated a reluctance to hold
pharmacists liable under the theory of strict liability. 7 8 This ap-
peared to have been a violation of the policy of section 402A sup-
plier liability in this Commonwealth and contrary to the decisional
law applicable to strict liability. The decision in Coyle by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania was the final pronouncement that
provided immunity to pharmacists from strict liability caused by
the products they sell.
Comment c of the Restatement imposes supplier liability on all
persons in the business of selling.17 9 It appears from the language
in that section that the drafters were concerned with placing the
burden of compensation for injuries on the seller. Comment c
states that "the justification for strict liability has been said to be
that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption,
has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any
172. Murphy, 710 P2d at 252. This case involved a strict liability action brought by a
DES daughter against the manufacturer who produced DES, a drug taken during pregnancy
to reduce the risk of miscarriage, and the pharmacy that sold the DES to her mother. Id at
249. The supreme court held that a pharmacy could not be held strictly liable in tort for
injuries caused by a defective drug. Id at 253.
173. Id at 251.
174. Id at 252. The Cal Bus & Prof Code 4046 (West Supp 1987), subdivision (b),
provides that the practice of pharmacy is a "dynamic patient-oriented health service that
applies a scientific body of knowledge to improve and promote patient health by means of
appropriate drug use and drug related therapy." Murphy, 710 P2d at 252.
175. Murphy, 710 P2d at 252.
176. Webb v Zern, 422 Pa 424, 220 A2d 853 (1966).
177. Coyle, 584 A2d at 1384.
178. Makripodis, 523 A2d at 377.
179. See note 53 for the text of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment c.
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member of the consuming public who may be injured by it."'' 80 The
commentary draws no distinction between types of consumers or
products.
A narrow construction of the word "seller" was rejected by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Francioni.'8' The court extended
"seller" to include both a "seller" and a "supplier." 82 Under this
definition, the pharmacy qualifies because it not only is in the bus-
iness of selling, but also is in the business of supplying prescription
drugs to the public. 83 The reluctance of the Pennsylvania courts to
hold pharmacists liable makes no sense in light of the holding in
Francioni, in which even the lessor of a tractor was considered a
seller under section 402A. It is even more difficult to understand
the reasoning of the court in not holding the pharmacist liable as a
supplier in light of Schriner, which held the supplier of electricity,
an extremely dangerous product, liable as a supplier.
The Pennsylvania courts have chosen only one section of the Re-
statement, comment k, on which to base their grant of immunity
to pharmacists from strict liability. The supreme court, in its adop-
tion of the Restatement in Webb,8 adopted not only section 402A
but also the commentaries supporting that section. If taken in the
context of the entire section of 402A, it would appear that com-
ment k should be reconciled with the other commentaries support-
ing the imposition of liability on all sellers and suppliers.
The policy behind giving consumers the right to be protected
from defects in the products they buy should extend to all consum-
ers including patient-consumers. It is even more important for the
consumer of prescriptions to know the benefits and risks associated
with the use of the drug than it is for consumers of other products
because of their even greater potential for harm. Because of his
special knowledge and expertise, 185 the pharmacist is in the best
position to effectively reduce the risk of injury caused by adverse
reactions to the drugs he sells. This can best be accomplished by
the pharmacist providing warnings directly to the consumer. Fre-
180. Id.
181. Francioni, 372 A2d at 740.
182. Id.
183. Murphy, 710 P2d at 252.
184. Webb, 220 A2d at 854.
185. Vandall, 18 U Toledo L Rev at 21 (cited in note 163). One of the key reasons for
holding a pharmacist strictly liable is that he is an expert in regard to pharmaceuticals. Id.
In most cases, the pharmacist knows more about the drug he is dispensing than the doctor.
Id. Pharmacists are extremely proud of their knowledge, education, and the fact that they
are a reliable source of information in regard to drugs. Id.
1991
Duquesne Law Review
quently, drug products are prescribed by telephone and prescrip-
tions are filled without a visit to the doctor, leaving the pharmacist
as the only one with the opportunity to provide warnings to the
patient.18 Giving the physician total discretion in his choice of
drugs infringes on the basic right of the consumer-patient to make
informed decisions regarding his treatment. In some cases, the
pharmacist knows more about the drug than does the physician.
Pharmacists argue against the imposition of strict liability because
of their lack of discretion in selecting the products they sell. The
seller's ability to select the products sold, however, has never been
a consideration in previous strict liability cases.'
87
Imposing strict liability on pharmacists may prove to be an in-
centive to safety, contrary to the rationale adopted by the
courts.'88 If liability falls on product sellers even when they cannot
eliminate the product-related risk, the seller will inevitably raise
their prices in order to cover the cost of compensating the injured
consumer. Fewer products will be produced because of a decreased
consumer demand. Product-related injuries should decline in cor-
relation with the decrease of the availability of dangerous prod-
ucts. 89 Under the threat of strict liability, sellers would take a
more preventative approach to the distribution of their prod-
ucts. 90 In addition, strict liability creates an incentive to improve
the product through research and testing.' 9 '
The theory of loss shifting has been adopted by the courts as
justification for holding manufacturers and sellers strictly liable to
the consumer on the theory that the manufacturer and seller are in
a better position than the consumer to bear the damages caused by
the product. Likewise, the pharmacist is in a better position to
bear the loss of the consumer-patient caused by dangerous effects
of the drugs he sells. The pharmacy can adequately protect itself
in the same manner as other traditional sellers by purchasing
products liability insurance and/or obtaining a vendor's endorse-
ment with the manufacturer providing indemnity to the phar-
macy.'2 In this way, the pharmacy can bear the loss of injury more
186. Comment, 49 U Pitt L Rev at 300 (cited in note 71).
187. Vandall, 18 U Toledo L Rev at 46 (cited in note 163). See also Comment, 49 U
Pitt L Rev at 298 (cited in note 71).
188. See Comment, 49 U Pitt L Rev at 300 (cited in note 71). See also Nelson and
Susina, 19 U Toledo L Rev at 795 (cited in note 164).
189. Ausness, 78 Ky L J at 747 n.241 (cited in note 67).
190. Id at 747 n.242.
191. Id.




effectively than the individual consumer. This loss shifting caused
by placing liability on the pharmacist will cause the pharmacist to
exercise more care, and will aid in promoting safety.
Before ingesting any drug, a consumer has a right to know the
full extent of the benefits and risks that are associated with the use
of that drug. This right can be exercised only if the consumer pos-
sesses enough knowledge to make an intelligent choice. The basic
right of the patient to make an informed decision is infringed upon
when the physician is given total discretion in the choice of the
drug to be used. Consumers frequently lack the very knowledge of
the risks associated with their prescribed drugs which might have
influenced their decision as to whether or not to take the drug. If
pharmacists were required to warn, the manufacturers would have
to provide them with consumer warnings to be distributed with the
drugs. The drug would only then become defective and unreasona-
bly dangerous if the warning was not provided to the consumer by
the pharmacist. By adhering to their duty to warn, pharmacists
would find no additional liability placed on them than what they
presently bear. The argument for applying strict liability to the
pharmacist appears to be consistent with the present law of strict
liability for sellers and suppliers of products as set forth in section
402A.
Sally Apter
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